Duration of Coalition Bargaining: The Impact of Particularistic Politics

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Abstract

In this paper I use insights from bargaining theory to study delays in the formation of government coalitions and, in particular, how the politicians' relative preferences over policy and office influence bargaining duration. I argue that cross-national incentives to pursue particularistic policies induce politicians willingness to accept policy compromises and consequently the bargaining duration. The hypotheses derived from the model are tested on a sample of coalition formation opportunities in 10 Western-European countries. The results indicate that particularism does influence bargaining duration.

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1 Introduction

The formation of government coalitions is topic of considerable interest to scholars of parliamentary democracy. Scholars of presidential politics have also begun focusing on the formation of legislative coalitions to a greater degree though formation of coalitions in presidential systems does not attain the same prominence because of a clearer separation of legislative and executive powers. For comparative scholars a proper understanding of government formation is especially important because it is an important link between the preferences of the voters, expressed in elections, and the eventual policy outcomes that are formulated and enacted by the governing coalition.

One of the main criticism against multi-party parliamentary systems is that they lack the accountability that two-party, or presidential, systems offer. The lack of accountability has, at least, two sources. The first stems from the fact that in the presence of multi-party governments, the voters may not know who to blame for poor performance, and realizing that, the parties may naturally be tempted to point the finger at their coalition partner(s). The second part of the problem touches more directly on the process of coalition formation and explains why coalition formation is important to understand. The importance of accountability centers on the idea that the voters can punish 'bad' governments. More importantly, the threat of punishment induces governments to enact policies that its citizens approve of. The process of coalition formation determines how the outcome of an election is translated into executive power in the legislature. Without an understanding of the relationship between electoral results and the coalition that forms, the voters have limited capabilities to disperse punishment. That is, a lack of an understanding of this relationship implies that whether a particular party enters into coalitions is unpredictable and the voter, therefore, lacks the means to punish 'bad' parties.

The literature on coalition formation has advanced considerably in recent years with the application of new formal and empirical methods. Yet, the literature remains somewhat divided on the basic issue of how to model, formally or not, the preferences of politicians. Some have proceeded by assuming that politicians are *office-seeking*, i.e., that they value holding office for the various perks that come with it (Riker 1962). Others have assumed that politicians are

policy-seeking, i.e., that their primary concern is to influence policy outcomes (Axelrod 1970). The two assumption lead to different predictions about the types of coalitions that form. Office-seeking politicians are, e.g., expected to form minimal winning coalitions to maximize their benefits from holding office whereas policy-seeking politicians are expected to form, e.g., coalitions with a small ideological range that may have minority or supermajority support.

Martin & Stevenson (2001) put both the theories to the test and conclude that both the assumptions have some explanatory value. However, a cursory examination of the patterns of coalition across countries reveals strikingly dissimilar patterns of coalition formation cross-nationally. In some countries, e.g., in Denmark, minority coalitions are the norm, while in others, e.g., in Iceland and Belgium, minority coalitions are hardly ever formed. This suggests that the results of (Martin & Stevenson 2001) may appear because the effects associated with each assumption are averaged across countries – that is, it remains possible that politicians in some countries are purely office-seeking while elsewhere they are purely policy-seeking.

Indridason (2004) presents a theory that explains the cross-national differences in coalition formation by focusing on how the motivations of politicians may differ across political systems. In particular, I argue that the prominence of particularistic politics influences the patterns of coalition formation via the incentives that politicians face. Where clientelistic politics have gained a foothold, access to the distribution of the particularistic goods assumes the role of an important electoral resource.[1] Holding office can generally be assumed to increase the politician's access to particularistic goods. A politician in a clientelistic political system will therefore place a relatively higher value on holding office than a politician that faces no incentives to engage in particularistic politics. Consequently, office-based theories of coalition politics should find greater support in clientelistic societies. Conversely, policy-based theories should find greater support in non-clientelistic political systems. In other words, the presence of clientelism induces a particular type of preferences among politicians.

I find that while the ideological characteristics of a coalition do influence

[1] I will use the terms 'clientelism' and 'particularism' interchangeably. I recognize that many will object to this (ab)use of the terms but I discuss them in greater detail below. Generally, one may argue that clientelism implies particularism but not the other way around.

the likelihood of its formation, as predicted by policy-seeking theories, the impact depends on the importance of particularistic politics within the country (Indridason 2004). The present paper extends this insight to the study of the duration of coalition bargaining. The paper thus has a dual purpose. First, it derives additional hypotheses about the influence of particularistic politics on coalition politics in order to subject the theory to a further test of robustness. This is done by shifting the focus from one aspect of coalition politics, formation, to another, bargaining duration, and asking: What implications does the theory have for bargaining duration?

Second, bargaining duration is a substantively interesting phenomenon. Extensive periods of government durations may be undesirable as interim governments do usually neither have the legislative capacity nor the political legitimacy to initiate new policies. Interim governments are, therefore, largely restricted to do no more than take care of the day-to-day tasks of governments. Similarly, periods of coalition bargaining are characterized by uncertainty about the makeup of the next government and, consequently, uncertainty about the future direction of policy, which may have adverse effects on the economy (Martin & Vanberg 2003).

The literature on bargaining duration in the context of coalition politics is tiny in comparison to the attention coalition formation has attracted. To the best of my knowledge only two papers have been written on the topic. Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998) employ the intuition given by existing work in bargaining theory. To generate bargaining delay in game theoretic models of bargaining they must incorporate some form of asymmetric information. In deriving their hypotheses, Diermeier and van Roozendaal focus on factors that are likely to reduce the uncertainty of the bargaining partners, which allows the partners to reach an agreement more quickly. They, for example, argue that elections and the defeat of the government in parliament increase the uncertainty that the parties face. Therefore, forming a coalitions directly after an election or after the government has been defeated will on average take longer than in other circumstances.

Martin & Vanberg (2003) follow a similar line of reasoning but argue that Diermeier & van Roozendaal's (1998) account is incomplete because it fails to take into account the ideological composition of the bargaining partners. In addition

they argue that the 'complexity' of the bargaining process ought to influence bargaining duration. In particular, the higher the number of bargaining partners the more difficult it is to reach an agreement.

In what follows I formulate and test several hypotheses about the duration of coalition bargaining. In the next section I define particularistic politics and briefly discuss my definition in relationship with existing definition of particularism and clientelism. A more thorough discussion can be found in Indridason (2004). In the following section I further develop my theoretical framework and derive from it several testable hypotheses. In section 4 I subject these hypotheses to an empirical scrutiny using a sample of 10 parliamentary democracies. The final section offers conclusions and suggests avenues of further research.

2 Particularism

Defining particularistic politics, or clientelism, is not a simple exercise. Several different definitions of the concepts exist in the literature. The definition of particularism employed here is motivated by the theory, i.e., it aims to capture the incentive for politicians to behave as policy- or office-seekers. Thus, I define particularism as a pattern of political competition where the *particularistic* allocation of state resources is aimed at, and is important for, maximizing the political actors' probability of re-election.

The definition requires a couple of remarks. First, the definition covers a wide range of behavior that aim to secure the position of the politician. Patronage and pork-barrel politics, e.g., fall under the definition. Particularism is thus not taken to mean that the politician's behavior is directed at individuals but rather that he can claim credit for providing a certain constituency with benefits. Particularism is clearly related to the idea of 'the personal vote' (e.g., Cain, Fiorina & Ferejohn 1987, Carey & Shugart 1996). However, the literature on the personal vote assumes that individual candidates build a personal vote but, in contrast, the definition above allows the party to be the recipient of the benefits of particularistic behavior. Second, there is a tendency to identify particularism (and especially clientelism) with deviations from policies serving the public interest. However, as almost all policies benefit some voters over others, the perceived

'fairness' of the policies is not a good indication of whether particularistic interests are at the driving wheel. Thus, rather than focusing on the content of the policies, it is the degree of discretion available to the politician that defines particularism.

While the definition of particularism used here is not common in the literature it resembles Kitschelt's (2000) definition of clientelism. Kitschelt (2000) argues that the distinction between clientelistic and programmatic politics is procedural rather than distributional. Hence, it is not the distributional consequences of public policy that determine whether it can be termed clientelistic but whether it distributes benefits "as matter of codified, universalistic" (Kitschelt 2000, p. 850) principles. In Kitschelt's definition, programmatic politics imply that voters within the same constituency are not discriminated against on the basis of their voting behavior.

The definition used here, however, sees the constituency as a viable beneficiary of clientelism. It is sufficient that he discriminates against voters across constituencies. Admittedly, this broader definition has some weaknesses. It becomes even harder to distinguish between particularistic policy from "true" public policy. It does, however, offer some benefits over other contending definitions for the purposes of the present study. Most importantly, the definition is weaker than most of the definitions used in the literature. Most instances of clientelism identified in the literature therefore qualify as clientelism under my definition.

3 Particularism and Coalitions

In this section I lay out a simple theoretical framework that is useful in thinking about coalition politics in a comparative perspective. While the basic theoretical framework can accommodate a variety of factors that may influence the induced preferences of politicians I have focused here on particularism.

Martin & Stevenson's (2001) basic intuition was that it appears quite plausible that politicians are motivated by both policy *and* office. This assumption is echoed here but it is taken a step further, i.e., although politicians may care about both policy and office it also appears plausible that there is some variance cross-nationally in *how much* they care about office relative to policy. This is

not to say that there are cultural, or genetic, differences along this dimension across countries but that different political systems encourage different types of behavior. Some political systems may tend to reward politicians that adopt particularistic strategies while others favor those that focus on policy. There is, for example, a large literature on how different electoral systems generate different incentives to build a personal vote (e.g., Carey & Shugart 1996, Ames 1995) and how electoral pressures influence the choice of redistribute policies (e.g., Lindbeck & Weibull 1987, Dixit & Londregan 1998, Dahlberg & Johansson 2002).

The prevalence of particularistic politics will vary across different countries as different institutions generate different incentives. Thus, regardless of their 'true nature', politicians in some countries will behave as office-seekers while in other countries they will behave as policy-seekers.[2] Politicians in countries characterized by particularistic politics will be observed to behave as office-seekers whereas an emphasis on programmatic politics will induce politicians to behave as policy-seekers.

The implications for studying the types of coalition that form are fairly straightforward; where particularism is important the hypotheses of the office-seeking literature ought to find greater support. For example, where particularism is prominent the ideological composition of the (potential) coalition ought to have less influence on the likelihood of it forming. These expectations are borne out by the data (Indridason 2004).

The implications for the duration of coalition bargaining are also fairly straightforward. As pointed out by Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998), the formal literature on bargaining offers insights into the factors that influence bargaining duration. I begin by sketching a simple bargaining model that allows me to deduce some hypotheses regarding the influence of particularism and bargaining duration.

Consider a stylized model of bargaining between two parties with asymmetric information. The bargaining takes place between two parties A and B. Party A is the formateur. The formateur makes party B offers to join him in a coalition

[2]Of course, without explicitly considering the political institutions, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the differences can be chalked down to differences in the 'nature' of politicians in different countries. Examining the effects of the relevant political institutions avoids future research.

at discrete time points, $t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$. The offer consists of a policy compromises, $x_t, t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$, and party B can, at each point in time, either accept or reject the offer. The parties preferences as $u_i = \delta^t[-(1-\alpha)(x-x^i)^2+\alpha], i = A, B$, where δ is the discount factor, x is the policy compromise that the parties agree upon, x^i is the parties' ideal policies, and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ measures the relative importance of particularism. That is, if $\alpha = 1$ is important only getting into office matters whereas if $\alpha = 0$ then only policy matters. Finally, assume that A is uncertain about the location of B's ideal policy but x^B is a random draw from a probability distribution, $F(x)$.

The model is a slight modification of Muthoo (1999, p. 271-285) who provides a proof of existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.[3] The equilibrium has some nice intuitive qualities. In equilibrium the formateur makes concessions in each round as he updates his information about party B's ideal policy. In each round the formateur can make an offer that would be accepted instantly by B but that offer would, however, involve sacrificing all of the policy benefits that the formateur stands to reap from the bargaining. The formateur therefore engages in 'screening', i.e., making offers that an ideologically similar bargaining partner might accept, that trade-off the risk of bargaining failure in the current round against the possibility of getting a more favorable policy. If particularism is important it provides an added incentive to conclude the bargaining early. At the extreme, $\alpha \to 1$, the parties care nothing about policy and reach an agreement instantly. Thus, in the bargaining framework patterns of particularism politics should imply shorter delays in coalition formation.

Hypothesis 1 *The pervasiveness of particularism is positively correlated with the duration of government formation bargaining.*

It is important to note that the importance of particularism will also condition the effect of some of the variables discussed by Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998) and Martin & Vanberg (2003). As the argument focuses on the relative importance of policy and particularism, the effects of particularism are unlikely to be uniform across all bargaining situation. Suppose two (very) ideologically similar parties are bargaining. Then particularism is unlikely to have much influence

[3] Muthoo's (1999) proof of existence only requires minor changes to go through and therefore I do not provide the proof here.

on bargaining duration because in *relative* terms concerns about particularism will trump policy concerns – simply because there is very little disagreement about policy. In contrast when ideologically distant parties bargain the scope for particularism to influence bargaining duration is far greater.

Hypothesis 2 *The duration of coalition bargaining is decreasing in the bargaining parties' ideological similarity.* ***When particularism is important the effect of the ideological similarity declines.***

The above, and the following, hypotheses thus specify how the hypotheses in Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998) and Martin & Vanberg (2003) are conditioned by the importance of particularism. The first part of each hypotheses below refers to the statement of the original hypothesis. The second (boldfaced) part states the nature of the conditionality.

Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998) ask whether the previous government was defeated in the legislature impacts bargaining duration. They argue that previous defeat influences bargaining duration because such defeated is often lead to leadership challenges within the defeated parties. Particularistic politics reduce this effect of previous defeat because i) the number of potential coalitions is much higher because ideological preferences are less likely to rule potential coalitions out as ideologically incompatible and ii) the parties have a stronger incentive to resolve their leadership struggles quickly and surely in order to be able to participate in the coalition bargaining.

Hypothesis 3 *The duration of coalition bargaining is longer when the previous government suffered a defeat.* ***When particularism is important the effect of previous defeat is attenuated.***

Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998) also argue that the presence of a continuation rule, i.e., where the incumbent coalition may continue governing without resigning after an election if the coalition parties wish to do so, will decrease bargaining duration. The presence of particularistic politics should have the effect of reducing the bargaining duration even further because it provides the governing parties with an additional incentive to continue their coalition and not explore alternative coalition possibilities.

Hypothesis 4 *The duration of coalition bargaining where countries use a continuation rule.* ***When particularism is important the hypothesized effect of the continuation rule is stronger.***

4 Testing the Theory

Data

I test the above hypotheses using Martin and Vanberg's data on bargaining duration. The data contains information on bargaining duration between 1950-95 in 10 countries.[4] The data contains information about bargaining duration as well as the independent variables investigated in Martin & Vanberg (2003). The variables include whether elections immediately precede coalition bargaining, defeat of previous government, whether an continuation was employed, a measure of coalition identifiability, the number of parties in the coalition, and the minority status of the coalition. I consider each of these variables in my statistical analysis.

As my hypotheses focus on the effects of particularism on coalition formation I supplement Martin and Vanberg's data with my measures of particularism. I begin by considering three variables that can be expected to capture certain aspects of particularism while they may fall short of being perfect measures of particularism. These variables are *corruption*, *transparency of government*, and *government effectiveness*.

My measure of corruption is Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from 1998. The CPI summarizes the results of various surveys concerning corruption. The number of surveys used to create the index varies from six to ten depending on availability.[5] The index has a range of 0-10, with high number indicating lower levels of corruption.[6]

Corruption is clearly not the same phenomenon as particularism (following

[4] I am currently making an effort to expand the sample – both in time and space.

[5] The surveys used to create the CPI in 1998 came from Economist Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, World Development Report, Gallup International, the World Competitiveness Report from IMD, the World Economic Forum, and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy.

[6] The corruption perception index has been compiled since 1985 but 1998 was the first year that the index was calculated for all the 10 countries in my sample.

directly from my definition) but there are nonetheless reasons to believe that particularism and corruption will generally go hand in hand. To some extent corruption and particularism stem from the same root. Corruption is often defined as "the misuse of public power for private gain" (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 91). Sometimes the definition of corruption includes the notion of illegal practices. The focus on illegality appears somewhat arbitrary. Conventional usage of the word "corruption" is not limited to illegal activities but also those that are seen as simply morally dubious. Awarding a contract to a particular contractor, whether or not due process was followed, can be seen as "corruption". More importantly, what is illegal varies from one place to another, which reduces the usefulness of the above definition of corruption somewhat.

The main difference between the two concepts thus centers on the type of gains. Particularism or clientelism, loosely speaking, involves trading political favors for votes, or perhaps generous campaign contributions. The latter would in most places be considered a corrupt practice while the former would generally been seen, at least, as less corrupt. Corruption, on the other hand, also includes the exchange of favors for material benefits. Thus, it is possible to have corruption without clientelism. If, however, corruption is rampant, holding public office becomes even more valuable and politicians thus have an incentive to divert some of their efforts from obtaining material benefits to securing an additional term in office. However, there is no use denying the fact that there is the potential that corruption and clientelism may actually be quite distinct phenomena. It is therefore important to consider other variables to check the robustness of the results.[7]

Government transparency refers to the degree with which the government's policies are non-partial and its actions are predictable. As particularism relies on the discretionary exercise of political power a high level of government transparency leaves less scope for clientelistic behavior. The data on government transparency comes from the Institute of International Management (IMD), which surveyed over 4000 firms in 46 countries in 1998. Two countries in my sample,

[7]Note that theoretically corruption has the same effect as particularism and finding evidence for the effect of the variable on coalition governance would thus be substantively interesting. It increases the value of holding office and consequently one can simply exchange corruption for particularism in each of the hypotheses above.

Iceland and Luxembourg, were not included in the survey. A high score on the IMD-index indicates a high level of government transparency.

Finally, government effectiveness is a measure of the quality of the public services provided by government, competence of public service, and the credibility of government commitment to policy. The index captures the notion that particularism relies on a (socially) inefficient allocation of government resources, thus degrading the quality of public services. In addition, the index captures some aspects of government transparency. The data on government effectiveness is taken from Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (1999) for the year 1998. The data in Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (1999) differs from the two previous indices in that a more advanced methodology is used in compiling the index from various surveys.[8] Again, a high score on the index indicates a high level of government effectiveness.

To make the interpretation of the results slightly more intuitive I invert the indices above so that higher values indicate higher levels of particularism.[9] Table 1 provides summary information for the three variables.

Table 1: **Summary of independent variables**

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Missing
Corruption	-8.01	-10	-4.6	-
Transparency of Government	-5.12	-7.1	-3.1	Iceland, Luxembourg
Government Effectiveness	-1.44	-2.03	-.69	-

Before presenting the results it should be noted that the independent variables I use to measure particularism have only been compiled, in the most favorable case, since the mid-1980s and then only for some of the countries. Coincidentally, all the measures used here are from 1998, which has the benefit of allowing better comparison between the three measures. There are two reasons why I believe this limitation is not too damning to my findings. First, most accounts of clientelistic

[8]Kaufman, Kraay & Zoido-Lobatón (1999) use an unobserved components model to estimate a score on the index for each country. Their model is of the form $y_{jk} = \alpha_k + \beta_k * (g_j + \epsilon_{jk})$, where y_jk is the observed outcome on index k in country j, g_j is the underlying governance variable, which is assumed to be a random variable, and ϵ_{jk} is the error term. The governance index is constructed as the mean of the distribution g_j conditional on the observed data y_{jk}.

[9]This does not influence the results in any other way than to change the value of the coefficient estimated for these variables.

politics emphasize cultural and historical factors as an explanation. Although I find the explanation a bit hard to swallow it at least suggests, or rather takes cue from the fact, that particularism or clientelism is a rather persistent phenomenon. Hence, if the importance of clientelism changes over time it can either be assumed to change rather slowly, or that changes are few and far between. Second, when changes do occur there is evidence to suggest that they change from higher to lower levels of clientelism. Treisman (2000), Keefer (2002), and Tanzi & Davoodi (1997) show, for example, that the number of years of democratic government is inversely related to corruption and positively correlated with the extent of public investment, which is more amenable to rent-seeking. As an example from the sample of countries in this study, clientelism was rampant in Iceland until, at least, the 1970s but subsequently clientelism appears to have declined impressively in importance.[10] The measures used here would thus tend to bias the results against my hypotheses since the results will tend to underestimate the importance of clientelism in the earlier part of the period.

Methods

I estimate the impact of the independent variables using survival analysis, more specifically, a Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox proportional hazard model provides estimates of the impact of the independent variables on the hazard rate, that is, the probability that an event, here the conclusion of a coalition bargain, occurs at some time t given that it has not occurred yet. The great advantage of the Cox model is that is that it places relatively lax assumptions on the baseline hazard function, e.g., it does not require assuming that the hazard rate is monotonically increasing or decreasing. It does, however, assume time invariant and proportional effects.

Results

The results, displayed in tables 2 and 3, are largely in line with expectations. First, the results are largely in line with Martin & Vanberg's (2003) findings with

[10]Kristinsson (1996), **?**. Iceland received a score of 1.5 (ranked 8^{th} among the 13) on government effectiveness and 9.3 on corruption (3^{rd}). Data on transparency of government was not available.

one minor exception. Whereas Martin and Vanberg failed to find evidence of previous defeat influencing bargaining duration, as Diermeier and van Roozendaal did, previous defeat does appear to have statistically significant effect here – albeit only at the 10% level. Second, the estimated effect of particularism is consistent across the different measures used. Perhaps not surprisingly, the clearest conditional effect is with respect to the governments ideological range. The interaction term between particularism and the presence of a continuation rule is, marginally significant in two of the six specifications.

Table 3 includes all the same variables as the previous table with the exception of *identifiability*. Identifiability is intended to measure the extent to which voters are presented with identifiable coalitions before elections. Thus, identifiability is expected to influence bargaining duration because the bargaining situation is characterized by some structure specifying, to a greater or a lesser degree, which coalitions are possible, or likely, to form. In consequence, the bargaining is less complex and takes less time to conclude. It is, however, reasonable to argue that identifiability, which is essentially a pattern of behavior among politicians, is a part of what we want to explain. The theoretical argument presented above aims at explaining precisely these sort of patterns, and previous research has shown that particularism does explain the types of coalitions that form (Indridason 2004), and would presumably contribute to an explanation of where identifiability comes from. For this reason, i.e., that the theory presented here offers an explanation at a more primitive level, identifiability is excluded from the models in table 3. However, the exclusion of the variable has only modest influence on the result.

Interpretation of the results is slightly complicated by the fact that *particularism* is used to create several interaction variables. That is, the effect of an increase in particularism can not be gauged from the estimated coefficient on *particularism* since it also has an effect through the three interaction terms, i.e., whether the ideological range of the coalition is large, whether the previous government was defeated and whether a continuation rule exist will all impact the marginal effect of particularism.

As the results are similar across all the models I will focus on column 1 in table 3 in providing some examples of the substantive effects. First, note that

Table 2: **Duration of Bargaining**

	Transparency	TransparencyI	Effectiveness	EffectivenessI	Corruption	CorruptionI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Election	-.543***	-.584***	-.518***	-.492***	-.532***	-.567***
	(.183)	(.185)	(.177)	(.183)	(.179)	(.181)
Previous Defeat	1.584*	1.966*	1.575*	1.685*	1.591	1.397
	(.937)	(1.010)	(.936)	(.967)	(1.018)	(1.011)
Identifiability	.174	.160	.118	.102	.147	.203
	(.124)	(.123)	(.119)	(.123)	(.121)	(.130)
Continuation Rule	1.231***	2.844***	1.052***	3.293	.997***	-2.641
	(.303)	(1.059)	(.299)	(4.022)	(.317)	(3.158)
Ideological Range	.706*	.844**	.428	.441	.621*	.577
	(.361)	(.383)	(.337)	(.338)	(.375)	(.372)
No. Parties in Government	1.275***	1.328***	1.244***	1.257***	1.251***	1.246***
	(.134)	(.138)	(.136)	(.138)	(.136)	(.135)
No. Parties in Gov't * ln(T)	-.448***	-.457***	-.451***	-.455***	-.452***	-.450***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)
Minority Government	-.473**	-.371	-.386*	-.351	-.348	-.420*
	(.223)	(.233)	(.227)	(.235)	(.227)	(.237)
Particularism	-.334*	-.533**	-1.379*	-1.487*	-.260*	-.202
	(.201)	(.243)	(.756)	(.787)	(.145)	(.151)
Particularism * Ideol. Range	.209***	.239***	.477**	.482**	.109**	.104**
	(.074)	(.079)	(.241)	(.241)	(.047)	(.047)
Particularism * Prev. Defeat	.304*	.373**	1.192*	1.271*	.205*	.174
	(.177)	(.190)	(.649)	(.671)	(.121)	(.121)
Particularism * Continuation		.305		1.365		-.392
		(.193)		(2.447)		(.338)
Obs.	191	191	203	203	203	203
e(ll)	-683.294	-682.046	-741.904	-741.75	-741.84	-741.163

Table 3: **Duration of Bargaining II**

	Transparency		Effectiveness		Corruption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Election	-.48***	-.526***	-.471***	-.444**	-.487***	-.497***
	(.177)	(.178)	(.17)	(.174)	(.174)	(.175)
Previous Defeat	1.691*	2.092**	1.665*	1.796*	1.681*	1.6
	(.928)	(1.003)	(.927)	(.956)	(1.01)	(1.007)
Continuation Rule	1.352***	3.049***	1.156***	4.172	1.084***	-.734
	(.294)	(1.055)	(.28)	(3.853)	(.31)	(2.901)
Ideological Range	.704*	.853**	.447	.463	.622*	.598
	(.36)	(.383)	(.334)	(.336)	(.373)	(.373)
No. Parties in Government	1.232***	1.29***	1.218***	1.241***	1.225***	1.216***
	(.131)	(.135)	(.133)	(.137)	(.134)	(.134)
No. Parties in Gov't * ln(T)	-.452***	-.461***	-.455***	-.459***	-.456***	-.456***
	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.037)	(.036)	(.036)
Minority Government	-.527**	-.418*	-.43*	-.373	-.383*	-.43*
	(.221)	(.231)	(.223)	(.233)	(.226)	(.238)
Particularism	-.367*	-.57**	-1.447*	-1.58**	-.283**	-.258*
	(.199)	(.24)	(.749)	(.777)	(.143)	(.147)
Particularism * Ideol. Range	.202***	.235***	.477**	.485**	.106**	.103**
	(.074)	(.079)	(.238)	(.24)	(.047)	(.047)
Particularism * Prev. Defeat	.327*	.4**	1.257*	1.352**	.216*	.203*
	(.175)	(.189)	(.642)	(.663)	(.12)	(.121)
Particularism * Continuation		.321*		1.849		-.197
		(.193)		(2.359)		(.313)
Observations	191	191	203	203	203	203
Log likelihood ratio	-684.286	-682.902	-742.391	-742.088	-742.572	-742.372

the coefficients in the model are interpreted as an effect on the hazard rate. A positive coefficient thus implies a higher hazard rate, which in turn implies higher bargaining duration.

Unless otherwise noted the effects reported below are calculated holding all independent variables fixed at their mean (or mode if dichotomous). Post electoral bargaining takes longer to conclude – the odds of formation at time t are over 38% lower for coalitions that form immediately after elections. Although the coefficient for *previous defeat* is positive, the effect varies with the importance of particularism because of the interaction term of particularism and previous defeat. When particularism is not important previous defeat indicates longer bargaining duration but when particularism is dominant previous defeat has, in line with the hypothesis, a negative impact on bargaining duration. This stands to reason because when particularism is important the actors bringing about the fall of the government are likely to be willing to fill its shoes. *Continuation* has a strong negative impact on bargaining duration. The impact is stronger in the presence of particularistic politics as expected.

The impact of the *ideological range* of the government on bargaining duration is positive over nearly the entire range of values particularism takes. The impact on the odds ratio can be as much as a 48% change when particularism is very important. The findings with respect to the number of parties in government is in line with Martin and Vanberg's finding – initially the effect is positive but eventually it turns negative. Minority governments take on average longer to form, perhaps reflecting the fact that minority governments are often the end result of failed attempts to form majority coalitions. The effect on the odds ratio is substantial or 41%.

Finally, *particularism* has the hypothesized effect on bargaining duration except when the the ideological range of the coalition is very small. Figure 1 graphs the effects of one standard deviation change in particularism on the odds ratio while varying the ideological range of the government. As can be seen on the graph the effect of particularistic politics is substantial when the ideological range of the coalition is large – the hazard rate more than doubles in these circumstances.

Figure 1: The effect of one standard deviation change in particularism for governments with different ideological range

5 Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to explain what factors influence the length of coalition bargaining duration. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of various institutional and ideological factors. Here I introduce another factor that is likely to influence the bargaining duration and which might be described as the nature of the electoral competition. My argument emphasizes the ways in which politicians build and sustain political support for their candidacy. In some societies there are strong expectations that politicians deliver services or favors to the constituents while in other places they are expected to campaign on the basis of general public policy. The question what factors determine the nature of political competition is an extremely interesting one but lies beyond the scope of this paper. Instead I simply focus on the impact of particularistic politics on bargaining duration and find that it does indeed have some explanatory value.

Another aspect of the paper that I consider important is that the theory considered here has implications beyond the study of bargaining duration. Indeed, the theory was initially intended for the study coalition formation. It does, how-

ever, have implications for various facets of coalition politics. This paper is thus, in a sense, an effort to assess whether the theory is correct by applying it to another facet of coalition politics or by teasing as many hypothesis out of the theory as possible. So far the theory appears to have stood the test with respect to explaining coalition formation and bargaining duration. Future extensions, e.g., to coalition duration, are in the plans.

The theory presented here concerns the influence of particularism on coalition formation. The more general point to be made is that the two strands of theorizing about coalition politics, policy- vs. office-seeking models, can be tied together in a more systematic manner than previously has been done. My focus here has been on particularism, but in principle any variable that influences the politicians' induced preferences in a systematic manner could be substituted. As such, one of the 'proxies' for particularism here, corruption, might constitute such variable. The presence of corruption may make the value of political office higher, and consequently, induce office-seeking behavior on behalf of the politicians. Similarly, other perks of office such as ministers' salaries and the increased future earnings after leaving office should also influence patterns of coalition formation.[11]

[11] Diermeier, Keane & Merlo (2002) demonstrate how the value of office might be estimated in a study of U.S. congressional careers.

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